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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003501

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STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,  
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL, STATE FOR NSC JWOOD, OSD FOR SHIVERS,  
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TAGS: [MARR](#) [SNAR](#) [PGOV](#) [AF](#)

SUBJECT: POLICE LEADERSHIP CHANGES AT THE MINISTRY OF  
INTERIOR

REF: (A) KABUL 2384 (B) KABUL 2684 (C) STATE 134520  
(D) STATE 142964

Classified By: Classified by Amb. William Wood, Reasons 1.4 B and D.

11. SUMMARY: President Karzai announced the appointment of 28 Afghan National Police (ANP) officers for ANP command positions and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) headquarters staff jobs October 5. All of the 28 have been vetted through the rank reform process, UN human rights review and the USG Leahy process, which means that they have met the minimum standards for professional performance and literacy. Although the reality of Afghan internal politics still reflects a high degree of cronyism and corruption, these appointments reflect the Interior Ministry's understanding that they must appoint rank reformed and competent police officers in order to address international community (IC) demands for MOI reform. This move, taken together with overall police rank reform and the shifting of the local governance office from the MOI to the Presidential Palace (Ref B) represents an important step by Karzai and the IROA in the ongoing MOI reform process, and partial fulfillment of Karzai's commitment at Camp David in August on police reform. While positive, this tranche of personnel changes by itself will not be sufficient to overcome the MOI culture of corruption. The Afghans understand that they will have to do more, and Interior Minister Zarar indicated to Ambassador Wood that plans are being made for additional changes. END SUMMARY

12. (SBU) Interior Minister Zarar submitted the names of 32 ANP officers for ANP command and MOI staff jobs in August to President Karzai for approval. Subsequently, Zarar removed four of the candidates from the list based on United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) human rights concerns. President Karzai announced the 28 appointments on October 5 which included (among others): Chief of Police for Kabul, Head of Administration at MOI, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Deputy and five provincial Chiefs of Police.

13. (C) Zarar told PolMiloff September 25 that the proposed changes reflected his desire to deploy well trained and

professional ANP leaders to command positions. Zarar said his choices for the provincial Deputy Police Chiefs and other MOI staff jobs reflected his desire to rotate ANP provincial deputies to Kabul while replacing them with capable ANP officers from Kabul. In an October 4 meeting with the Ambassador, Zarar said the appointments would have a positive impact on the MOI, and that another plan is in the works for more changes at the MOI. The Ambassador said he welcomed this step and offered to support Zarar in the reform process where he could.

EXPERTS ASSESS THIS AS A POSITIVE MOVE

¶4. (C) Kabul-based IC experts judge the personnel changes as a net gain for MOI professionalism and reform momentum. INL Civilian Police Mentors believe these changes are a MOI reaction to the increased pressure placed by the international community on Zarar to assign rank reformed candidates to police positions. Senior UNAMA political officers, with years of experience in Afghanistan and a keen familiarity with Afghan political and tribal relations, view this change as Zarar's attempt to install stronger leaders in police commands to increase the MOI's control over police administration in the provinces. Their analysis is that these appointments reflect an evolution of the ANP from a collection of provincial militia commands that routinely abused their populations to a more professional force that will provide security, although they anticipate that graft and corruption will continue, albeit on a more efficient basis.

¶5. (C) UNAMA believes the appointments are a positive outcome because all of the general officer candidates

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successfully passed through the rank reform and have been vetted through UNAMA and the Leahy process. Per Ref A, The IRoA is making progress towards completion of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) rank reform process to reduce the currently over-manned Afghan National Police (ANP) officer corps to an efficient level by selecting the best qualified officers through an extensive testing, selection and vetting process. This is reinforced by the fact that Zarar agreed to remove from the initial list prepared in August four candidates with human rights violations. (NOTE: Juma Gul, the newly appointed Chief of Police for Uruzgan and a former provincial chief with the National Directorate of Security (NDS), was not part of the regular rank reform process; he was reviewed by a specially convened MOI board and subsequently cleared through UNAMA and the USG Leahy vetting process, per Ref D). This is a marked improvement from a July list of which fully 25 percent had not passed rank reform. INL and UNAMA experts concur that political patronage will undoubtedly continue to play a role in any selections at the MOI.

¶6. (C) As for Zarar's own position, FM Spanta remarked to A/S Boucher one the margins of the UNGA that Karzai was considering replacing Zarar (REF C), but both Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and UNAMA believe that Zarar will survive any near-term shake-up. In UNAMA's view, there is no one who can do the job, and removing Zarar at this time would reinforce perceptions of the weakness of the Karzai government.

WOOD